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On a recent visit to Pattani in March 2004, I asked a Muslim professor there about the
precipitating violence in the Muslim dominated southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala
and Narathiwat.  “What’s happening here?  Who’s behind the spate of violence that we’ve
experienced recently? (i.e. since the January 4 2004 raid on the military camp in
Narathiwat)”  He replied to my questions with one phrase “khao yam.”  
Khao yam translates as rice salad and has a northern Malaysian counterpart in the
Kelantanese nasi kerabu.  This dish has rice mixed with a variety of chopped fresh
vegetables and herbs and it is served with naam budu (a thick fish sauce which is produced
in fishing villages in southern Thailand) and lime and chili sauce.  As the photo caption
below says, khao yam is “unusual, elegant and very typical of southern Thailand.”  
We can also read of the violence in the Muslim-dominated southern Thai provinces as
akin to khao yam—a mixture of many different ingredients resulting in a presentation so
unusual, elegant and very typically southern Thai.  In this paper, I analyze the different
“ingredients” that constitute the regional southern Thai feast of violence and terror.
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‘Kao Yam Pak Tai’, a Southern treat.
Khao yam pak tai—an intriguing breakfast salad.  The presentation is exquiste.  A
small pile of fragrant boiled rice, accompanied by finely chopped heaps of lemon
grass, bean sprouts, long beans, sour mango and chopped makrut or kaffir lime is
served with spicy chilli pepper, budu with fresh lime and a piquant sweet-sour
sauce.  It’s unusual, elegant, and very typical of southern Thailand.
While the Thai government has constantly and consistently assigned all blame for the
violence in the south to Muslim separatists and Muslim militants, evidence reveals that
there is no one mastermind to the violent activities in the south.  Instead many interest
groups operate, often independently of each other, to create a climate of fear and terror
that has negatively affected both Muslims and Buddhists in the region.  Until and unless
the Thai state admits to the khao yam-like nature of the violence recipe in the south and in
so doing halts its “all-Muslims-are-terrorists” campaign of retaliation, it is unlikely that
peace will prevail in the south in the near future.  
The Ghost of Separatism
The anchoring ingredient of khao yam is the fragrant boiled rice.  It forms the base onto
which other ingredients are added.  Without this ingredient, one will not have khao yam.  
The discourse of violence in the Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in
southern Thailand takes its anchor from what I call the “ghost of separatism.”  Any and
every official discussion on the violence in the south is tagged onto this apparitional
entity which is constantly resurrected to take blame for the violence in the south.  This
ghost of separatism is fed by the history of the more than two decades old (from the early
1960s to the late 1980s) separatist war between the Thai state and Malay-Muslim
separatist rebels in the south.  Despite the fact that separatism is no longer a viable
political alternative in present-day Thailand,1) it continues to haunt the region and it
becomes the scapegoat for blame.
In my article entitled “The Ghost of Separatism Revived,”2) I examine how despite the
waxing and waning of its influence and activities in Thailand, the Malay-Muslim separatist
movement of Thailand has been blamed for almost every violent act perpetrated in the
region and Malay-Muslim separatists are portrayed as perpetual threats to the sovereign
Thai state.  The history of separatism in the Muslim region of southern Thailand means
that separatists become the convenient ghosts, not only of blame and censure, but more
importantly to facilitate the periodic recreation of the myth of the integrity of the nation-
state.  By present a constant threat to its existence and by extension to its citizens, the
nation-state seeks to evoke the loyalty of its citizens.  At the same time, the ghost of
separatism allows for the state to suppress and censure certain elements in society by
labeling them separatists.  As a result, even when the separatist movement may no
longer be viable, the nation-state will keep it alive and well in order to call attention to its
citizens to constantly support the existence of the nation-state and by extension, maintain
the supremacy of the state and its rulers.  
Why does the state need to engage in this exorcism?  What premises necessitate the
creation and maintenance of such a spooky myth?  
From the perspective of the Thai state and Thai-Buddhists, the territory that comprises
the Muslim dominated provinces (once the old kingdom of Patani) was conquered land
which was rightfully won in a war waged by the Siamese monarchs and ultimately
incorporated as a rightful part of the independent Thai state following the Anglo-Thai
treaty of 1909.  Prior to this, the kingdom of Patani had maintained a tributary
relationship with its more powerful overlord, the Siamese monarch.  This system of
tributary payments continued even after the conquest of Patani by the Siamese monarch
in 1786.  The introduction of the thesaphiban or direct system of administration in the
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1890s eliminated this suzerain-vassal relationship and caused the Malay-Muslim provinces
to come directly under the administrative control of the central government.3) The treaty
of 1909 sealed the fate of this region as an indisputable part of modern nation-state of
Thailand by effectively introducing national and international territorial and sovereignty
boundaries between Thailand and Malaysia.  
From the Thai-Malay perspective, they represent a defeated people who were
incorporated into the Thai kingdom following the expansionary wars of the Siamese
monarchs.  As members of the Malay race and as followers of Islam, they felt themselves
different and separate from their Thai-Buddhist conquerors.  The defeat of the Malay
kingdom of Patani meant the wresting of political and economic power from the hands of
the Malay nobility and the re-location of these powers in the hands of the predominantly
Thai-Buddhist bureaucratic officials.  The charge of siphoning wealth from the resource-
rich Thai-Malay states4) to fill the coffers of the Bangkok-based central state became
rallying points in the separatist war against Thailand.5) The governing of a defeated
people, which Thailand carried out through forced attempts at assimilating the Malay-
Muslims through education in the Thai language, the privileging of Thai over the Malay
language as well as the denigration of Islam by Thai-Buddhist officials and teachers6), gave
rise to clear boundaries between the Muslims and their Buddhist conquerors and added to
the cause of separatism.  The notion of Bangkok as an occupying force in the south
remains till today as seen in the strategies and actions employed by different Thai-
Buddhist administrations with deal with the Malay-Muslims in the south, argues historian
Tamara Loos7).
To Thai-Buddhists, on the other hand, the notion of the old kingdom of Patani as being
territory separate from Thailand does not exist.  The history of the creation of the nation-
state of Thailand is founded upon fear, as Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul argues in
his famous work Siam Mapped 8).  Though never formally colonized, the physical geo-body
of the Thai nation-state was formed by a series of treaties initiated by the French colonial
governments of Vietnam and Laos and the British colonial governments of Burma and
Malaya.  The fear of losing further territory seen in the red enemy of communism to the
east in the countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the colonial British power to
the west (Burma) and south (Malaya) led to the creation of a Thai self that had to oppose
itself to Other selves, namely Mon, Karen, Shan, Lao, Hmong, Khmer or Malay.  Thais of
different ethnicities were expected to privilege their national identity over their ethnicity,
especially when this ethnicity was seen as a potential threat to national sovereignty.
Anthropologist Andrew Cornish9) gives an ethnographic account of this fear as portrayed
in an army concert in the southern Thai Muslim province of Yala.
The concert was a mixture of light comedy and popular songs, but had a serious
finale in which the performers depicted Thai history in front of a large map of
Thailand.  The map at first showed the borders of Thailand extending over much of
Southeast Asia, but as the narrator spoke actors in various foreign costumes strode
onto the stage to steal successive pieces of the map and run away with them.  The
narrator explained how the Thais were a people constantly under threat, who needed
to be constantly vigilant against attempts to steal their territory.  One of the stolen
segments comprised the whole of present-day peninsular Malaysia, and the southern
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border region where Yala is located was specifically indicated as one of those areas
still under threat.
In the case of the south, by identifying as Malays, these southern Muslims living at the
border possessed the potential to identify with another nation-state, namely Malaysia.
The history of separatism whereby the expressed goal of some separatist groups was to
secede from Thailand and become part of Malaysia then made the Thai-Malays a
potential threat to the nation-state of Thailand.  This fear then forms the root of the ghost
of separatism that dominates the discourse of violence in southern Thailand.  Despite the
fact that separatism is no longer an actively espoused ideology among the Muslims of
southern Thailand, it is actively kept alive by the Thai-Buddhist state and administration
and used as an effective tool of governance.  
Mercenary criminals
Just like the chopped bean sprouts that give khao yam a nice crunchy flavor without
being too overpowering, a not too potent ingredient to the violent spectacle in southern
Thailand is the mercenary criminal.  They are known as nak leng 10) in Thai and oghe
deber in Pattani Malay which roughly translates to mean “gangster.”  Many of them are
ordinary southerners from depressed backgrounds.  We also find among them, ex-
separatists who upon being granted amnesty by the Thai government, renounced their
separatist affiliation and returned to their homes in Thailand.  Having been exposed to a
life of offensive action, they became hired hitmen (assassins) and gunmen and body
guards for a variety of influential men who needed protection and other security jobs to
be done11).  
Working as hitmen is a lucrative occupation, as many Thai-Buddhists and Malays
engage in bubuh peringkat.  Meaning “up one’s status,” this phenomenon was highly
characteristic of southern Thai society, said a Muslim informant.  Often men of prestige
(phuu yay, literally meaning “big men” in Thai) would try to eliminate rivals in order to
maintain supremacy in the society.  Their ability to wipe out opposition to their position
means that they are able to attract more “followers” who do their bidding.  Such “people
power” enables them to control access to a wide variety of making interests, further
adding to their economic and political power.  In my research village, such status
contestations took place in the late 1980s when men occupying the positions of village
headman (kamnan) and village big men (phu yay baan) were killed, often by assassins
hired by the other, so as to assert their status and establish their dominion in the village.
These status contestation killings ended when the family of the slain phu yay baan left the
village to return to the wife’s family in another province.  Villagers told me that these
status killings were often blamed on separatists since those killed were village officials and
hence civil servants.  However, the real killers were never caught since the security
officers were looking for the wrong men, said the villagers.  
The activities of the mercenary criminals who carry out the biddings of men of prestige
have always been an aspect of the violent landscape in the Muslim provinces of southern
Thailand.  These mercenary criminals are the foot soldiers of the phuu yay or influential
men and they carry out the biddings of their powerful employers.  Such jobs assigned to
them are often violent in nature and their activities add to the highly diverse drama of
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violence in the south.  Despite the fact that the activities of these mercenary criminals are
more pervasive and sustained than those of separatists, yet the blame for all violent acts is
often placed on the separatists who are seen as the quintessential criminals of the Muslim
south of Thailand
Local warlords
Another ingredient in the khao yam dish is sour or the unripe green mango.  This is
chopped into small bits and when added to the rice, it gives a contrasting sour taste that
mingles with the other tastes that adorn the dish.  Just like the sour mango that mixes with
the dish to complement the other tastes present, there are local warlords in the south who
blend in with the population and do their share to control vice activities in the region.  
They control brothels, bars, big businesses, smuggling rings and the drug trade.  Many
of the local warlords are the phuu yay I referred to above and they are often the bosses of
many mercenary criminals.  I have been told that illegal operations of some of the local
warlords are quite elaborately organized.  With potential access to huge profits, turf wars
and animosities are common and these add to the kaleidoscope of violence in the south.
A Muslim official of the now defunct Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center
(SBPAC) told me that a local mafia operates in the Betong area in Yala province.  This
mafia is controlled by Chinese but the hired guns are local Thai-Malays.  The activities of
these local warlords are more routine and routinized compared to those of separatists who
violent activities are seasonal.  In fact, much of the violence in the Muslim south can be
attributed to the activities of the local warlords.  
Petty criminals
The local warlords and the mercenary criminals are often dependent on each other but
petty criminals are ordinary criminals who steal, kill, push drugs or engage in other
criminal activities.  They are independent crime operators who do not work for or report
to a criminal warlord.  
Because reports of a higher level of common banditry in southern Thailand much
more than in other areas of the kingdom has been reported, this makes it difficult to
differentiate between lawless activities committed by criminals or terrorist activities
commissioned by separatist movements or other groups with vested interests in creating
mayhem in the region.  
It is interesting though how such common banditry is often linked to the separatist
ghosts in Thailand.  In one incident in 2000, the sons of a well-to-do Buddhist
businessman were kidnapped and held for ransom by Muslims.12) When the father
refused to accede to the ransom demands written in Malay language, the two boys were
beheaded.  The newspapers were rife with the “Abu Sayyaf-style assassination” (quote
Bangkok Post), insinuating Thai-Muslim separatists with possible links with the militant
Filipino Muslim separatist group.  Often such “axes of terror” are imagined of the Thai-
Malays in southern Thailand.
Royal Thai Army
Without accompanying sauces, the bland dry rice with raw vegetables will not taste
good.  In fact the sauces are essential ingredients to a delicious khao yam.  In the discourse
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of southern Thai violence, the spicy chili sauce may be seen as the army.
Thailand’s military outfit, the Royal Thai Army, is divided into four regional units to
deal with security issues in each of these geographical regions.  The 1st Army Region
comprises central Thailand, the 2nd Army Region covers the northeast while the 3rd Army
Region extends into the north and northwest of the country.13) In the southern part of the
country, the 4th army, the southern regional arm of the Royal Thai Army stretching
from Chumpon and Ranong to the Thai-Malaysian border with regional headquarters in
Nakorn Si Thammarat, is charged with maintaining order and security in the region
together with the Civil Police Military Task Force (CPM) 43.14) The two main security
threats in the southern region have been the active Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)
and the Muslim separatists.  
The Civilian Police Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43), a counter-terrorist outfit based in
Yala, was the one remaining interagency task force left over from the successful counter-
insurgency days of the late 1970s and the up through the mid-1980s.  The CPM, modeled
after the British government’s efforts to defeat Malayan communists, combined civil,
military and police tactics while emphasizing the political and military aspects of the
operations to defeat communist insurgents.15) However, following the defeat of the CPT
and Malayan Communist Party (MCP) elements in the South circa 1985, CPM 43
continued to prove its usefulness to the Thai Government by being able to apply the same
66/23 and 66/25 principles that had proved highly effective with the communists to the
problems of Muslim separatism and organized violent activities by criminal elements in
the name of Muslim separatism and or terrorist groups.16) In July 1998, another order was
issued, the Prime Minister’s Office Order 127/2541 to allow separatists who had fled
abroad to return to Thailand without facing charges as long as they did not have criminal
records.17)
Orders 66/23 and 66/25 were put into effect by the Yala-based CPM 43.  Particularly
effective in rural areas and in the open spaces of national parks, CPM 43 tied together the
diverse elements of the Border Patrol Police,18) Thahaan Phran or civilian mercenaries also
known as Rangers, and regular Thai Army Troops and Air Force and or Navy elements
when needed.19) Additionally, CPM 43 was also tied into the larger intelligence apparatus
of the Thai Military, which through several different organizations including the Armed
forces Security Center as well as several three numbered directorates of the Army
Operations Center in Bangkok, maintained several very large and effective agent
networks, which were tied into many of the Muslim and criminal communities located
throughout the region.  Many of these intelligence networks leveraged the good will,
which had earlier been established with countless individuals during the Counter-
Insurgency period in which individual CPM, CPT and Muslim Separatists combatants
were treated with dignity when they surrendered to Thai Government forces and were
given an allocation of land to farm and a full return to the civil rights as Thai Citizens.
Also tied into this structure was the very successful Royal Projects system, which first
began by the Royal Family in the South (due to King Bumiphol’s intense interest in
finding ways to successfully combat the various insurgencies), and later was expanded to
other regions.  Under the Royal Projects mandate, Army units were given funding
directly by the Royal Family to construct, maintain and to train the local populace on the
operation of humanitarian based projects such as schools in rural areas and dams and
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other type infrastructure construction endeavors.  Additionally, the Border Patrol Police
(BPP), which was under the operational control of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and
the Provincial Police for the Southern Region were also part of the ISOC/CPM 43
structure.  Last but not least the Provincial Governors were also tasked to support the
ISOC/CPM structure.  
However, the security agencies charged with restoring peace to the region have
themselves been responsible for some of the violence in the region.  For example, the
thahan pran or Rangers stationed in the south have been especially noted for their
brutality20).  For example, in November 1987, Rangers from the 43rd Regiment at Cho
Airong in Narathiwat killed four unarmed Muslims, shooting them in the backs and
heads after rounding them up in Yala.  The commander of the regiment tried to conceal
the incident by claiming that the Muslims had been killed in a clash with the Communist
Party of Malaya but statements to the contrary from the victims relatives led to the
transfer of the commander21).  On the other hand, Rangers from the 41st Regiment have
focused on intelligence collection and civic action programmes including planting fruits
and vegetables, constructing fish ponds, and building chicken farms.  On August 20, 2002,
the Regiment began a bamboo planting project in Raman district in Yala.  It represented
Yala in a national water resource competition in 2000 and won first place22).  
While itself responsible for some of the violent acts perpetrated against the Muslims,
the Army through its CPM 43, did at least maintain control throughout the years over the
situation in the south while working with other Thai Government agencies.  
However, in early April 2002, following Thaksin’s decision to turn over the
responsibility of security in the region to the Thai Police, the wheels began to come off in
terms of order and security throughout the Muslim south.  
Another move by the Thaksin government was to dismantle the Southern Border
Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC).  The SBPAC was a major administrative
body, which was established one step above the provincial governor level and was
assigned the overall administrative responsibility over all of the five provinces within the
Southern region (viz. Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun and Songkhla).  Originally
established to help support the overall counter-insurgency effort during the mid 1980s, the
Center proved to be most useful after the CPT and CPM insurgencies were defeated in
managing the Thai Government’s response to violent activities by various Thai Muslim
separatist groups, any terrorist type activities and or criminal activities by any group or
groups conducted in the region.  Additionally, the Center was well known throughout the
South for being able to listen to complaints from southern Muslims concerning corrupt or
inept Thai Government officials and was believed to be able to order the transfer any
civilian senior government or military official within 24 hours if the complaints were
proven to be accurate.  While operated by the Ministry of the Interior, the Center was
also staffed by officials from agencies throughout the Royal Thai Government and the
Ministry of Defense.  
At the same time when the SBPAC was dismantled, CPM 43 was dissolved and its
Combined Force disbanded on May 1, 2002, following a direct order from the Prime
Minister’s Office23).  The deactivation of the Ministry of Interior’s SBPAC along with the
transfer of all responsibility for security in the entire region from the Royal Thai Army’s
4th Army Region to the Thai Police marked the beginning of a new spate of killings and
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violence in the south.  The transfer marked the removal of an old but proven and
effective Thai government apparatus, which had successfully managed the specter of
violence which has plagued the region for many years.  The SBPAC had also been
instrumental in orchestrating the transition from widespread insurgent and separatist
activity for over fifteen years to a peaceful one.  It had, in the process, also greatly
improved the dialogue between the Thai government and the largely Muslim population.
While not perfect, this structure had nevertheless begun to successfully integrate the
largely Muslim population into the Thai mainline political and business communities,
something even the most inventive Muslim ideologically based propaganda could not do.  
However, many army officials did not merely focus on their job of intelligence
gathering and security in the region.  They began to engage in money-making deals like
other corrupt government agency officials.  Soldiers have been arrested for stealing
weapons from the army which were sold for good money and later sent to aid the
militants fighting in Aceh and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.24) In fact, Thaksin himself
made the claim that the salary of a soldier of 6000 baht a month is too little and may
cause him to indulge in corrupt activities.  The removal of power from the army to be
placed in the hands of the police is also seen as a turf war and the army that lost power as
well as spoils from the region was seen as itching to return to the region.
The Thai Police
Another essential sauce to add to the taste of khao yam is budu.  The police in the south
represent another essential peace-keeping unit but they were never charged directly
with security matters in the south.  Having removed the army, Thaksin put in its place a
corrupt Thai Provincial Police structure whose only claim to fame to date lies primarily in
the large percentage of its officers who have been implicated in corrupt or illegal narcotics
activities in other regions.  
The police forces stationed in the southern region were united under the command of
the Police Region 9, under the Ministry of Interior and responsible for police functions in
the urban communities in the southernmost provinces25).  The southern Thai border
provinces comprising the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun and Songkhla
have long been known to serve as a dumping ground for corrupt and/or incompetent
civilian and military officials, a trend that has alienated the local population from the
central government.  Many of these officials are not from the region, have little
understanding or respect for the ways of the local people and are seen as removed from
the local affairs.  I myself have been privy to such events and comments from the non-
Muslim officials who complain about the poor command of the Thai language among the
rural Malays, saying that they cannot speak Thai despite being Thai.  Despite the
prejudice against the local Muslims and because the local Muslims, who are the majority
population, are removed from close relations with the state officials, this environment
offers the perfect chance to take advantage and gain material benefits.  Muslims often hurl
charges at the local bribe-ridden police force for turning a blind eye to offences
committed by those who can pay their way out of legal punishment.  Police in the south
are charged with order there.  They were especially put in charge after Thaksin
dismantled the SBPAC and the 43rd Military Command.  They get a lot of perks being
there.  They are known to receive bribes from the criminals.  The border patrol police
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make a lot of money in the south from collecting payments from illegal smugglers.  At the
same time, commercial boat owners pay big sums to the police to secure the release of
those crewmen caught for illegal push-net and trawler fishing.  
On December 24, 2001, five policemen and a defence volunteer were killed in a
series of near simultaneous attacks on police outposts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.
The 43rd Regiment of the Army was called in to deal with this problem.  With this
resurgence of violence, both military and police have accused each other for the violence
in the region.  According to a 50-page report by CPM 43, “local police were largely to
blame for the troubles [in the Muslim south as] some police were tied in with influential
figures and involved in illegal businesses such as drugs, contraband and prostitution
[and that] police killings stemmed from personal conflicts between the slain officers and
local people.” 26) The Police Region 9 commander, Police Lt. Gen. Thawatchai
Jonsukhon, warned that the military presence was no longer required in the southern
provinces as the “separatist movements were scattered and no longer posed a threat”.  On
March 24, 2004, it was reported that the deputy chief of the national police would ask the
Prime Minister to remove two southern-based military ranger units for their alleged
involvement in the murders of police officers.27) In the meantime, General Kitti
Rattanachaya, a former commander of the 4th Army suggested that replacing soldiers in
charge of maintaining security with the police had led to the escalation of violence since
police were not trained to fight terrorists.28) Again, the fear of terrorists and the ghost of
separatism are invoked to bring the army back to its “rightful” place in the south.  
This “turf war” between the police and military is seen by many to have contributed to
the violence in the area.29) The war was particularly set off by the fact that the south, like
other border regions was the site of lucrative businesses including many illegal ones
such as smuggling of rice, people, drugs, arms, consumer goods and trade in contraband
as well as prostitution.  Phongpaichit and Baker30) report that the army and police in the
south, in cahoots with local politicians and gangsters, were part of the illegal racket.
While the rivalries between the two uniformed groups were neutralized in 1995–96 with
the formation of the joint police-army command, Thaksin’s dismantling of both the
police and army hierarchies upon assuming power caused the army and police to engage
in “open propaganda warfare, accusing each other of running drugs, smuggling,
prostitutions and other rackets.” 31)
In fact, the rivalry between the police and the army has been exploited by some to
their advantage.  Katherine Bowie32) writing about the organization of the Village Scouts
movement in Thailand, shows how the shift in the Thai King’s loyalties from the Thai
army to the police which had traditionally seen itself as protector of the King in the 1970s
won him support from the popular mass.  
It is clear that both the military and the police have effectively used their power for
access to various benefits.  The turf war between these two groups of custodians of peace
and security is itself seen to have contributed to the escalation of violence in the region.
In doing so, they have “covered their tracks” by often attributing all violent acts to
separatists.  Since they represent the official voices of the state of security in the nation,
their claims about separatist activities are seldom challenged and they form the official
opinion on terror in the region.
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Thaksin Shinawatra
The Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was elected to the premiership in
February 2001.  He is the first Thai premier to have won two terms in office.  No
previous elected premier survived one.33) Unlike other premiers who were not big
businessmen, Thaksin Shinawatra, the richest man in Thailand, began to introduce
business principles into political administration.  In this, he sought to run the state like a
big business with profit motives than as an administrative polity with people in it.  He
became a “CEO Prime Minister.”  In their most recent book, Thaksin: The Politics of
Business in Thailand (2004), Thai academics Phongpaichit and Baker explained what
Thaksin did to create a CEO administration.
He [Thaksin] claimed the methods of business management were superior to the
traditional practice of bureaucracy or government.  He lectured the Cabinet on the
latest management theory.  He launched schemes to convert diplomats and provincial
governors into “CEO diplomats” and “CEO governors,” meaning they were to
prioritize their role in assisting economic growth.34)
His CEO style of government, run on business principles that set targets for
achievements of objectives, saw him set deadlines for work that had to be done including
the handling of the violence in the south.  Setting deadlines focused on the end result and
failed to interrogate issues deeply so as to get a better understanding as to, for example,
the roots and causes of the violence in the south.  An important outcome of the CEO style
of government was strongly entrenched rule since economic stability was very much
dependent on political stability.  By dismantling the army and border patrol police in the
southern region, Thaksin wanted to remove the negative image of the south to encourage
foreign investment.  One such ambitious project was the gas pipeline project construction
to supply LNG from Songkhla province in the south to Malaysia.  Another was the
establishment of a halal food processing center in Pattani with the aim of turning the
coastal south into a seafood processing center as well as a tourism site.  
As seen from the above discussion, however, Thaksin’s attempt to deregulate security
in southern Thailand contributed to the perpetuation of more violence.  It is not surprising
that this “iron-grip Prime Minister” would have provoked opposition to his campaign
especially in the south which has always been a stronghold of the Democrat Party.  In
fact, the violent events in the south which saw a steady increase ever since Mr. Thaksin
took charge of the government was earlier seen as ploys to discredit Thaksin’s
government.  
Mercenary separatists
Mercenary separatists refer to those young men who are paid by separatist groups
based outside of Thailand, especially Malaysia, to sometimes leave bombs, torch schools,
etc.  These violent activities, which were a frequent occurrence during the height of the
separatist violence in the 1970s and 1980s, are re-enacted as a reminder to the Thai
state that the separatists are still intent on their ideology.  Mercenary separatists are not
usually personally convinced by the separatist ideology.  Instead, they use the payment
they receive for carrying out these violent acts to finance their drug habits and other
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leisurely activities.  Many of the young men who are recruited for such activities are either
jobless youth in Thailand or they go to work as illegal aliens in Malaysia.  Since their
illegal status exposes them to the threat of arrest, imprisonment and deportation, these
young men sometimes join the separatist groups based in Malaysia whose members
offer protection by informing these illegal workers of impending raids by immigration
officials.  The illegal workers then return the favor by carrying out violent acts for the
separatist groups.  
Often, the money collected from innocent victims in the name of separatism was
used to support their drug habits.  In fact, newspaper reports allege that separatist
organizations actually hire drug addicts to terrorist activities in the south.35) One
newspaper article reported that ‘separatists had introduced drugs into Muslim
communities, especially in the three provinces and once the poor residents became
addicted, they were made to work for the gangs.’  
Besides the youth, there were also those who used their separatist past to their
advantage by turning extortionists.  In fact, even ordinary thieves and criminals invoked
the ‘ghost of separatism’ to claim rewards for themselves.  For example, one Thai Malay-
Muslim villager told me the following tale.
There was this Chinese businessman who came to build a shrimp farm on the
piece of vacant land near the village.  I went to him and told him that the area was
controlled by a PULO member and he had to pay protection money in order to
operate his farm without molestation.  In order to make it look real, I took him to
Malaysia, blindfolded him after we got off the train and took him to meet with my
PULO friends in Kota Bahru.  The Chinese fellow paid a handsome sum of money
and my friends and I split it.
(66-year-old informant, Pattani)
These reward-motivated separatists, who are paid to carry out the violent acts on
behalf of the separatist organizations based in Malaysia, are what perpetuate the urban
legend of the ghost of separatism.  They serve to remind the state that the “separatist
threat” is still present36) and are therefore unwittingly responsible for the maintenance of
a regional security force charged with peace in the south—a security force that itself is an
active contributor to the spectacle of terror in the south with the aim of exploiting spoils
in the region.  
Separatists
As I have stated in an earlier paper,37) Thai-Malay separatists are not active in Thailand.
The greater majority are found in Malaysia.
Among the separatists based outside of Malaysia we find several types.  The common
feature they share is that they belong to the organized separatist groups such as PULO
(Pattani United Liberation Organization), BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), BNPP
(Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani) and more recently, the GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin
Islam Pattani).  
The grassroots separatists comprised mostly petty criminals or gangsters (orang deber in
Malay) who had committed petty crimes in Thailand and escaped to Malaysia where they
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met with their fellow countrymen who were members of separatist organizations and who
recruited them.  The affiliation of these orang deber with the separatist organizations
protected them from the Malaysian authorities since many of the separatist leaders had
close connections with the Malaysian police and politicians and therefore could protect
their members from arrest or harassment.  Many of these grassroots separatists often
occupied the lower levels of the separatist organizations, i.e. they were often the foot
soldiers.  Several ex-grassroots separatists that I interviewed told me that they often
never met with or had knowledge of the leaders of the separatist groups.  They often
received their orders from “middlemen” and carried out what they were told.  Many of
these foot soldiers often lived in Malaysia without legal documents as they could not get
Malaysian passports easily or could not afford to pay a lot of money (a minimum of about
RM 600 or 6000 Baht) to obtain fake Malaysian passports.  Although they had little
contact with the leaders of the separatist groups, my informants were informed by the
“middlemen” that the leaders were very well-placed in Malaysian society.  They had
obtained Malaysian citizenship as a result of their connections with influential figures in
Malaysian society and they were economically well-off compared to the foot soldiers.
This socio-economic hierarchy in Thai-Malay society where those at the higher end of the
hierarchy hardly interact with those at the bottom is a characteristic feature of Malay
society.38) That this feature was duplicated in the separatist organizations and ultimately
led to their break-up is an interesting issue to note.  
Many of these grassroots separatists surrendered to the Thai authorities after they
became disillusioned with the movement.  One informant lamented how he missed his
family, especially his mother who lived in Thailand.  Since separatism was a lost cause, he
said, he decided to surrender to the Thai authorities and he was granted amnesty and
reunited with his family.  Today he is married to a fellow Thai Malay and lives as a fruit
farmer in Pattani.  Many of my informants claimed that the grassroots separatists, on
discovering that life in Malaysia was not a bed of roses, decided to lay down arms and
return to Thailand in order to be with their families.  On returning to Thailand, many of
these ex-separatists turned to legitimate work including farming and business ventures.
Many of the separatists who surrendered to the Thai police were given land and money
and were also enrolled in programs to train them to undertake commercial farming and
animal husbandry.  As such, the separatist movement lost many of the earlier grassroots
separatists who had fled to Malaysia.  As a result, the movement had to recruit amongst
the new arrivals to Malaysia, the students as well as those who came to work illegally in
Malaysia.  
Many of the higher-ranking members of the separatist groups were more integrated in
society.  Several of them became restaurant owners and businessmen and their children
had become professionals as a result of their high academic achievements in Malaysia.
Among my informants were a few of these individuals who displayed a great deal of
resentment for the Thai government.  They displayed anger over their plights, that they
could not return to Thailand as a result of having been blacklisted by the Thai
government.  Many of them have become what I call cyber-separatists who have taken
their separatist struggle to cyber-space.  The two biggest separatist groups that operate
websites include PULO (www.pulo.org) and BRN (www.geocities.com/brn) although
the BRN website was hacked and shut down in 2001.  Many of these ideological
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separatists based outside of Thailand express much nostalgic anger against the Thai state
for what they view as the loss of the Malay occupied land of southern Thailand to the
Thai state.  While they do receive financial support from members of the movement
based in Thailand as well as from Thai Malays who go to work in Malaysia, especially
those who work illegally in the Thai-Muslim restaurants, also known as tom yam
restaurants, they have had little success in arousing ideological support for separatism
within Thailand itself.  They have, however, managed to remind the Thai government of
their presence by paying for mercenary separatists to carry out violent activities in the
south, including bombing and arson.  
Muslim Militants
To southern Thai-Malays, a separatist ideology no longer moves them these days but
what becomes a prized commodity is Islam.  Events since 9/11 have caused a greater
consciousness of the Muslim ummah and Thai-Muslims have been distraught with the
American war on terrorism which many Muslims see as a holy crusade against Islam.
The protests against the American “invasion” of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq by
Thai-Muslims who demonstrated and called for a ban on the purchase of American
goods is testimony to this disaffection.  
The recent incident of April 28 where 108 alleged militants were killed following
attacks by Thai-Muslims on Thai security outposts in Pattani, Yala and Songkhla has been
attributed to separatists influenced by Muslim militants.  The father of one of the young
men killed said the day before his son died, he was watching TV with his father and both
were extremely upset by what they saw as the ill-treatment of Muslims in Iraq.  Some
forces may be at work to influence them to jihad against the Thai soldiers and police who
they see as having brutalized the south.  The very fact that the Krisek mosque was
chosen as a place to die has much significance.  Never before have young men belonging
to the separatist groups willingly gone out to attack and be massacred.  Some of the young
men, like those from Saba Yoi district in Songkhla, were said to have cleared the land
around the cemetery and told their parents to bury them together if they died in the cause
of Allah.  The parents refused to wash them claiming that they died as martyrs for their
religion.  Furthermore, they had no getaway vehicles indicating that they had planned to
die.  Also, security officials have reported that these victims had been on drugs just like
the mujahideens in Afghanistan who are known to consume hashish before their mission.
Who are these guys influenced by?  At the present moment, there is little or no support
for the old separatist movement that was led by Thai-Muslim elites who have since fled
the country.  As the Thai government reduced its brutality towards its Muslim population
in the south, the support for the separatist movement began to wane.  At the same time, it
is important to note that much of the threat to the Muslims in the 1950s and 1960s was to
their ethnic identity.  The policies of the Thai government threatened the Malay language
and their cultural norms and values.  Islam faced little threat of annihilation although
Malays as Muslims felt discriminated by the Thai state.  Once this threat was removed,
separatism was no longer a valued pursuit.  Occasional attacks against the Thai state by
separatists came from those who were based outside of Thailand.  Within Thailand
though, there was little support for separatism.  However, in present times, Malay identity
is no longer under threat.  There is a general perception among Muslims in Thailand and
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elsewhere that Muslims and Islam are being violated.  At the same time, there are greater
divisions within the Muslim ummah in the south, seen in terms of a small but increasing
number of conversions from Sunni to Shi’ism as well as divisions between Muslims
pursuing a folk-based faith influenced by their Hindu-Buddhist past (known as kaum tua or
“old school”) and those seeking a purer form of Islam based on an appeal to the Qur’an
and Hadith (known as kaum muda or “new school”).  The relationship between these
various faultlines within the Muslim ummah and the current Muslim-inspired violence in
the south need further investigation.  
Conclusion
At a public forum at Chulalongkorn University last week, Maj. Gen. Khwanchart
Klaharn, Deputy Commander of the Fourth Army Region, said the Army was aware of
the possibility of renewed troubles in the region and was making preparations for it.  But
the January 4 raid on an Army base in Narathiwat province, which started the surge of
unrest, took place before the Army could implement any preventive measure.  He went
on to say the Army has been putting together information, which would lead to those who
were perpetrating the southern violence.  
He said the cause of the violence stemmed from “misguided youth groups” and some
religious teachers who wanted to bring about an independent Pattani state.  He said he got
this information from those who were arrested on April 28, and said the army was about
to find the mastermind.39)
From the perspective of the Thai security officials and by extension the Thai state, the
perpetrators of violence in the south are Muslims and the evil ideology that serves as
anchor for this violence is Islam.  As seen from the above quote, the official view is that
there is only one perpetrator to the violence in the south—the Muslim mastermind who
controls “misguided youth” and “religious teachers.”  This “Muslim perpetrator/violent
Islam” thesis also receives ready support among the political bigwigs in Thai society as
seen in the recent televised address by the Thai Queen.  In an address to about 1,200
village scouts and defense volunteers, the Queen condemned the southern Thai “brutes”
who had been killing innocent people in the south.40) Making a clear reference to the fact
that these southern “brutes” were Muslims, the Queen stated how killing innocent people
went against the teachings of the Qur’an.41)
This finger-pointing at Muslims and Islam as responsible for the current violence in the
south is the legacy of the history of Malay-Muslim separatism in southern Thailand.
This ready-made discourse then camouflages the reality and masks the identity of other
perpetrators behind the violence in the south.  It holds only one group, the Muslims with
a “mastermind” as responsible for all the violence happening in the region.  
By doing so, it encourages more violence in the form of retaliation by a wounded, hurt,
abused and harassed people.  Accusations become self-fulfilling prophecies and even
those who may not have anything to do with the spectacle of violence in the south may be
“encouraged” to participate as seen in the following incident.  Following the arrest of 2
Islamic religious school teachers in Narathiwat in June 2002 on charges of being Jemaah
Islamiyah members, a fellow teacher at the school is reported to have said, “I’ve never
heard of Jemaah Islamiyah until they grabbed my colleagues ... But if Jemaah Islamiyah
can bring justice, then I’d join.”42) Until and unless all perpetrators of the violence in the
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Muslim south of Thailand are identified and their crimes acknowledged by the authorities,
peace seems an unachievable goal in the near future.
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